
# Type 1.x Generalized Feistel Structures

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WCC 2013,
April 15-19, 2013, Bergen (Norway)

### Generalized Feistel Structure (GFS)




Encryption

ciphertext y


N bits

merge into N bits

- Poor diffusion property
  - It requires many rounds to be secure.



• Generally, GFS has the sub-block-wise cyclic shift  $(\pi_s)$ .




• Generally, GFS has the sub-block-wise cyclic shift  $(\pi_s)$ .

# Previous work [FSE 2010, Suzaki, Minematsu]

- Changing the permutation of Type 2 GFS from  $\pi_s$
- There are permutations such that
  - the diffusion property and
  - the security against several attacks

are better than  $\pi_s$ .



The diffusion property and the security improve.

# Previous work [IEICE 2013, Yanagihara, Iwata]


- FD (full diffusion): every output sub-blocks depend on all input sub-blocks
- For Type 1 GFS
  - $-\pi_s$ : the worst permutation in terms of the diffusion property among permutations archive FD.
  - The construction of the best permutation

# Previous work [IEICE 2013, Yanagihara, Iwata]

- For Type 3 GFS,
  - The condition of a permutation which cannot archive FD with any number of rounds.
- For Source-Heavy and Target-Heavy GFSs
  - $-\pi_s$ : the best permutation in terms of the diffusion property.

#### Example of unclassified types of GFS

- Key schedule function of TWINE [SAC 2012]
  - Two nonlinear functions in  ${\mathcal F}$  -Layer




#### Our work

- Propose Type 1.x GFS
  - covers Type 1 and Type 2 GFSs as special cases
- Propose a construction of a permutation for Type 1.x GFS with two nonlinear functions in F-Layer
- Present analysis of Type 1.x GFS with  $\pi_s$ 
  - compare proposed construction with  $\pi_s$
- Show experimental results for Type 1.x GFS for  $3 \le d \le 8$


## Type 1.x $(d, \eta)$ GFS

d sub-blocks  $(d \ge 3)$ 



- Type 1.x (d, 1) GFS  $\Leftrightarrow$  Type 1 GFS
- Type 1.x (d, d/2) GFS ( d is even)  $\Leftrightarrow$  Type 2 GFS


#### **Notation**



- $\pi_s = (d-1, 0, 1, ..., d-2)$  ( $\leftarrow$  left cyclic shift)
- $\pi(i)$ : the sub-block after applying  $\pi$  to the i-th sub-block.
- $r_{ij}$ : the smallest number r such that  $\pi^r(i) = j$ .


## DRmax [Suzaki, Minematsu, FSE 2010]


• DRmax $^{(d,\eta)}(\pi)$ : The smallest round such that every output sub-blocks depend on all input sub-blocks.




## DRmax [Suzaki, Minematsu, FSE 2010]

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


#### Proposed construction for $\eta = 2$

Let  $d \geq 5$  and a be an integer


such that  $1 \le a \le d-3$ 

$$\pi_p = \begin{cases} (1, 3, 4, 2, 5, 6, \dots, d - 1, 0) & \text{if } a = 1\\ (1, 4, 0, 2, 5, 6, \dots, d - 1, 3) & \text{if } a = d - 3\\ (1, 4, a + 3, 2, 5, 6, \dots, a + 2, 3, a + 4, a + 5, \dots, d - 1, 0) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



Type 1.x (9,2) GFS with  $\pi_p$  when a=1

# Properties of the proposed construction $\pi_p$





$$r_{01} = r_{32} = 1, r_{13} = a, r_{20} = d - 2 - a$$


#### DRmax of the proposed construction


**Lemma** Let  $d \geq 5$ . Then we have  $DRmax^{(d,2)}(\pi_p) = 2d - 4$ .

- Brief overview of the proof:
   Using the property,
  - The largest DRmax for encryption is  $DRmax_{E,\pi_p(2)}^{(d,2)}(\pi_p) = 2(r_{13} + r_{20}) = 2d 4$
  - The largest DRmax for decryption is 2d-4, because the structures of encryption and decryption are equivalent.











### DRmax with $\pi_s$


**Lemma :** For any  $d \ge 3$  and  $1 \le \eta \le \lfloor d/2 \rfloor$ , we have  $DRmax_{D,2\eta-3}^{(d,\eta)}(\pi_s) = max\{DRmax_{D,2\eta-3}^{(d,\eta)}(\pi_s), DRmax_{D,2\eta-1}^{(d,\eta)}(\pi_s)\}, where$ 


$$\operatorname{DRmax}_{D,2\eta-3}^{(d,\eta)}(\pi_s) = \begin{cases} \left(\frac{d-2}{\eta}\right)(d-\eta) + 2 & \text{if } (d-2) \bmod \eta = 0\\ \left\lfloor \frac{d-2}{\eta} \right\rfloor (d-2\eta) + 2(d-\eta) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


$$\operatorname{DRmax}_{D,2\eta-1}^{(d,\eta)}(\pi_s) = \begin{cases} \left(\frac{d-1}{\eta}\right)(d-\eta) + 1 & \text{if } (d-1) \bmod \eta = 0\\ \left\lfloor \frac{d-1}{\eta} \right\rfloor (d-2\eta) + 2(d-\eta) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
















For decryption direction



 $DRmax_{D,2\eta-3}^{(d,\eta)}(\pi_s) \ge 2d - 2\eta$   $DRmax_{D,2\eta-1}^{(d,\eta)}(\pi_s) \ge 2d - 2\eta$ 

$$DRmax^{(d,\eta)}(\pi_s) = max\{DRmax^{(d,\eta)}_{D,2\eta-3}(\pi_s), DRmax^{(d,\eta)}_{D,2\eta-1}(\pi_s)\}$$

### A comparison of two lemmas



#### Experimental results

- Compute  $DRmax^{(d,\eta)}(\pi)$  for all  $3 \le d \le 8$  and  $1 \le \eta \le \lfloor d/2 \rfloor$ .
- List  $\pi_s$  and all optimum permutations in terms of the diffusion property.
- Present only the lexicographically first permutations in the equivalent classes.
- Result for  $\eta=1$  is analyzed in [IEICE 2013]

#### Result for $\eta = 2$

d	$\pi$ DRmax			
	$(1,3,0,2)_{p}^{1}$	4		
4	$(3,0,1,2)_s$	4		
		6		
	$(1,3,4,2,0)_p^1$			
5	$(1,4,0,2,3)_p^2$	6		
	$(3,0,4,2,1)_s$	7		
	$(1,3,4,2,5,0)_p^1$	8		
	$(1,4,0,2,5,3)_p^3$	8		
6	$(1,4,5,2,3,0)_p^2$	8		
	$(3,0,4,2,5,1)_s$	12		
	(3,4,5,0,2,1)	8		
	$(1,3,4,2,5,6,0)_p^1$	10		
	$(1,4,0,2,5,6,3)_p^4$	10		
7	$(1,4,5,2,3,6,0)_p^2$	10		
	$(1,4,5,2,6,0,3)_p^3$	10		
	$(3,0,4,2,5,6,1)_s$	16		
	$(1,3,4,2,5,6,7,0)_p^1$	12		
	$(1,4,0,2,5,6,7,3)_p^5$	12		
8	$(1,4,5,2,3,6,7,0)_p^2$	12		
0	$(1,4,5,2,6,0,7,3)_p^4$	12		
	$(1,4,5,2,6,7,3,0)_p^3$	12		
	$(3,0,4,2,5,6,7,1)_s$	24		

#### Subscript

- s: it is equivalent to  $\pi_s$  .
- p: it is equivalent to  $\pi_p$ .
- Superscript
  - the integer a for  $\pi_p$ .

• For  $d \geq 5$ , there are better permutations than  $\pi_s$ .

#### Result for $\eta = 3$

d	$\pi$	DRmax	d	$\pi$	DRmax
6	(1, 2, 5, 0, 3, 4)	5 [FSE 2010]	8	(1,6,0,5,7,4,3,2)	9
	$(3,0,5,2,1,4)_s$	6		(1,6,0,7,2,4,3,5)	9
7	(1, 2, 4, 0, 5, 6, 3)	7		(1,6,0,7,3,2,5,4)	9
	(1, 2, 6, 0, 5, 3, 4)	7		(1,6,5,0,7,4,2,3)	9
	(2,0,5,6,3,4,1)	7		(2,0,5,4,6,7,3,1)	9
	(3,0,1,5,6,4,2)	7		(2,0,5,6,3,4,7,1)	9
	$(3,0,5,2,6,4,1)_s$	9		(2,0,5,6,3,7,4,1)	9
8	(1, 2, 4, 0, 5, 6, 7, 3)	9		(2,4,5,6,3,0,7,1)	9
	(1, 2, 6, 0, 5, 3, 7, 4)	9		(3,0,1,5,6,4,7,2)	9
	(1, 2, 6, 0, 5, 7, 4, 3)	9		(3,0,1,6,7,4,5,2)	9
	(1, 2, 6, 7, 3, 4, 5, 0)	9		$(3,0,5,2,6,4,7,1)_s$	13
	(1,3,5,4,6,7,0,2)	9		(3, 2, 6, 5, 7, 4, 1, 0)	9
	(1,3,6,4,7,2,5,0)	9		(3,4,1,5,6,0,7,2)	9
	(1,3,6,5,7,4,0,2)	9		(3,4,1,6,7,2,0,5)	9
	(1,3,6,7,2,4,0,5)	9		(3,4,5,6,7,0,2,1)	9
	(1,6,0,4,7,2,5,3)	9		(3,5,1,6,7,4,0,2)	9

Permutations in green are analyzed in [FSE 2010].

#### Result for $\eta = 4$

d	$\pi$	DRmax
	(1, 2, 4, 0, 7, 6, 5, 3)	6
	(1, 2, 5, 0, 3, 6, 7, 4)	6 [FSE 2010]
	(1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 4, 3, 0)	6 [FSE 2010]
	(1, 2, 5, 7, 3, 0, 4, 6)	6
8	(1,3,5,6,7,4,0,2)	6
	(1,3,5,7,0,2,4,6)	6
	(2,4,7,5,1,0,3,6)	6
	(3,0,1,4,7,2,5,6)	6 [FSE 2010]
	$(3,0,5,2,7,4,1,6)_s$	8

- Some permutations do not exist in [FSE 2010] results.
  - Because [FSE 2010] paper observed "even-odd shuffles". (instead of all permutations)

#### Conclusion

- Proposed Type 1.x GFS
  - covers Type 1 and Type 2 GFSs
- Proposed a construction  $\pi_p$  for Type 1.x GFS
- Analysis of Type 1.x GFS with  $\pi_s$ 
  - compared  $\pi_p$  to  $\pi_s$  in terms of the diffusion property
- Showed experimental results for Type 1.x GFS for  $3 \le d \le 8$

#### Future work

- Analyze the security against various attacks
  - differential, linear, impossible differential, and saturation attacks
- Design optimum permutations for  $\eta \geq 3$ .